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In a recent article entitled “Can Two-Way Direct Com-
munication Protocols Be Considered Secure?” [1], proto-
cols for two-way Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [2,
3], in particular the Ping-Pong protocol [4] and the LM05
protocol [5], were criticized under a specific well-known
attack called “Quantum-Man-in-the-Middle” (QMM) [2,
6, 7]. However, not only such an attack does not disprove
the security of two-way QKD, but it also represents one
of the weakest strategies available to an eavesdropper.
Two-way QKD involves a bidirectional quantum chan-
nel between the users Alice and Bob. Bob sends qubits
to Alice, who either encodes or measures them in a ran-
domly chosen basis. The former case corresponds to the
encoding or message mode (MM), which is used to de-
fine the key; the latter, to the control mode (CM), which
is used to detect a potential eavesdropper (Eve). Alice
subsequently resubmits the qubits to Bob for his final
measurements. The quantum transmission is followed by
a public discussion over an authenticated channel, where
the users reconcile and distill the final keys.
Ref. [1] overlooked the importance of the CM and pur-
ported that two-way QKD becomes insecure when at-
tacks do not induce errors in the MM. The QMM attack
is used as a specific example. Here, Eve swaps Bob’s trav-
eling qubit with her own, submits it to Alice and then
upon learning Alice’s encoding operation, duplicates it
onto Bob’s qubit before returning it to him. Such an
attack can only be detected in CM. This is enough for
the author of Ref. [1] to conclude that: (i) attacks which
leave no errors in the MM do not allow for security to
be established by standard methods; (ii) privacy ampli-
fication (PA) cannot be executed due to the absence of
a ‘critical value’ similar to BB84’s famous 11%; (iii) the
existing security proofs [8] are flawed as they do not con-
sider this specific class of attacks.
We argue that the above claims are erroneous and stem
from a fundamental misunderstanding of how two-way
QKD works.
This can be seen by considering the secure key rate
of a QKD protocol. In the asymptotic limit of many
signals, we can simply write it as R = IAB − IE , with
IAB the mutual information between the users’ keys and
IE an upper bound on Eve’s information on the key. In
two-way QKD, IE is obtained from the CM whereas IAB
is estimated from the MM. Therefore, the CM makes it
possible to properly execute the PA whereas the MM
enables a proper execution of the EC.
The fact that the QMM attack introduces no error in
the MM is inconsequential. In fact, while this implies
that IAB = 1, it also causes an error rate equal to 50%,
detected in the CM [2, 6, 7]. Hence, if Eve attacks a frac-
tion f of the qubits, the resulting secret key rate will be
given by R = 1 − f ≥ 0, with equality when f = 1, i.e.,
when Eve attacks all the qubits. Therefore, the proto-
col is always secure against such an attack, for any value
of f . The absence of errors in MM simply ensures the
unity value for IAB, to the legitimate parties’ benefit,
and has no bearing in determining the PA rate, which is
a function of IE estimated from the error rate in CM. Ob-
viously, differing values for errors in CM would translate
into differing PA rates, hence differing R, effectively dis-
missing the notion of ‘critical value’. However, a similar
argument applies even in the BB84 protocol, where the
amount of PA executed depends on the actual error rate
that has been detected, not on a predetermined critical
value like the 11% quoted in Ref. [1].
Finally, Ref. [1] also argued that the analysis in exist-
ing security proofs [8], which is based on Eve’s ancillae
interacting with Bob’s qubits via some unitary transfor-
mation, do not incorporate the QMM attacking strategy.
This is clearly untrue as QMM can be described as a spe-
cific case of such proofs. It suffices to consider Eve’s an-
cilla as a qubit and the unitary transformation as the well
known SWAP gate [9]. An attack in the backward path
is not made explicit as an extremely pessimistic stand is
taken where Eve is allowed to extract all possible infor-
mation from the entire Bob-Eve system without specify-
ing the actual mechanism.
Two-way QKD security proofs are quite complex and
include many different aspects. Simple attacks like those
described in Ref. [1] have been important to move the
first steps in this field, but real progress demands new
avenues and better criticism.
Notes: Let us remark we do not claim the security of
direct communication by the above, rather that of two-
way QKD, which is provably secure. It should be noted
that despite its title, the commented paper [1] was in fact
addressing two-way protocols within a QKD context.
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